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Abstract This paper focuses on coordinated inductive learning, concerning how agents
with inductive learning capabilities can coordinate their learnt hypotheses with other agents.
Coordination in this context means that the hypothesis learnt by one agent is consistent
with the data known to the other agents. In order to address this problem, we present
A-MAIL, an argumentation approach for agents to argue about hypotheses learnt by induc-
tion. A-MAIL integrates, in a single framework, the capabilities of learning from experience,
communication, hypothesis revision and argumentation. Therefore, the A-MAIL approach is
one step further in achieving autonomous agents with learning capabilities which can use,
communicate and reason about the knowledge they learn from examples.
Keywords Multiagent systems · Computational argumentation · Inductive learning ·
Learning from communication · Learning from argumentation · Coordinated inductive
learning
1 Introduction
The current dominating paradigm in machine learning (ML) is that data of interest is first
collected in a single repository and then learning upon that data is performed—we will call
this paradigm the centralized viewpoint of ML. In this paper we explore a paradigm in which
data collection and learning are interleaved: rather than completely collecting all the data in
a single repository, learning is performed on data collected in different repositories; later,
depending on the results obtained from learning, further data exchange can be performed if
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needed, potentially triggering further learning. We will call this paradigm the decentralized
viewpoint on ML. Learning in decentralized ML happens in two stages: in the first one,
learning is performed separately with the data existing in each repository; in a second stage,
the result of learning is coordinated between the agents (with some potential data exchange).
A common misconception about this decentralized viewpoint is that it is not needed, and
the research focus in the ML community is moving towards a big data approach. However,
the movement towards large amounts of data is about size, and does not imply the basic
assumption of the centralized viewpoint on ML: that all relevant data can be centralized
in one place before learning. Our claim is that, in general, it is unrealistic to assume that
all relevant data can be centralized in one place, and therefore a decentralized viewpoint
on ML is realistic, useful and strategically significant. In this approach to decentralized
learning, the only additional assumption needed is that, although some reasons might preclude
centralizing all data, some partial communication of data and learning results among the
different repositories involved is possible.
In this paper, we focus on logic-based inductive learning in the context of decentralized
ML, where communication will be addressed through a multiagent systems (MAS) approach,
where agents can learn from each other by some regulated communication process. Specif-
ically, we study a formulation of decentralized learning that we call coordinated inductive
learning (CIL). The goal in CIL is for each agent to learn an agreed-upon hypothesis that is
consistent with all the data known to all the individuals, but without having to share all such
data. In fact, since (as we will experimentally show) a large part of the content exchanged
during communication are induced rules, rather than raw data, this has two clear advantages:
(1) the size of communicated content decreases and (2) privacy concerns are diminished.
In order to achieve CIL, we propose an approach called Argumentation-based Multi-
Agent Inductive Learning (A-MAIL). The A-MAIL framework integrates inductive learning
and argumentation-based communication to achieve CIL. The key idea in A-MAIL is that
hypotheses inferred through inductive learning can be seen as arguments in an argumen-
tation process. Therefore, agents can use argumentation to reach an agreement over those
hypotheses and learn from each other. Since the agents will change their inductive hypotheses
to reach this agreement, we can characterize this process as (argumentation-based) learning
from communication. Specifically, A-MAIL consists of three processes: (1) the inductive
learning process, giving the agents the ability to learn hypotheses from examples; (2) the
argumentation process, with which agents can communicate, attack and defend hypothe-
ses; and (3) the hypothesis revision process with which agents update their hypotheses after
receiving new arguments. Thus, one of the main contributions of A-MAIL is that it studies
how to integrate, in a single framework, the capabilities of inductive learning, learning from
communication, and argumentation.
In general terms, we are proposing that the integration of learning and argumentation
can support decentralized learning. In a previous theoretical work [39] we presented a proof
that, under certain conditions, induction plus argumentation in a multiagent system with
decentralized data is actually equivalent to learning from a centralized repository of data.
That work showed that by having a logic model of non-monotonic reasoning for induction,
and another model of non-monotonic reasoning for argumentation, both can be integrated
as a model of a MAS that learns from data and communication in a correct way (where
correctness means that what is learnt in a MAS is logically equivalent to what is learnt
in centralized learning with a single repository of data). The limitation of such theoretical
approach is that the theoretical guarantees only hold in the (more limited) context of Boolean
inductive concept learning, and that we did not present any specific algorithm nor interaction
protocol, just a theoretical proof of the feasibility. In this paper, and based on those theoretical
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results, we present and empirically evaluate A-MAIL, which is a practical approach allowing
agents to inductively learn from their data and also from communicating with other agents
in a MAS. As we will see, however, A-MAIL is not restricted to Boolean inductive concept
learning and allows the induction of rules that are not 100 % correct—as is the usual and
practical approach in ML inductive concept learning techniques.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the problem
of CIL. Then Sect. 3 presents A-MAIL, a framework to achieve CIL, while Sect. 4 presents
how A-MAIL is used for CIL. An experimental evaluation of A-MAIL in several domains is
explained in Sect. 5. Later, three sections wrap up the paper with a discussion about A-MAIL’s
contributions (Sect. 6), related work (Sect. 7), and conclusions and future work (Sect. 8).
2 Coordinated inductive learning
Inductive learning focuses on how to learn general models or hypotheses from specific exam-
ples. In this paper we focus on concept learning tasks. Concept learning is typically defined as
follows: given a case-base E = {e1, . . . , en} with examples drawn from an example space E ,
a target concept C : E → {+,−}, and a hypotheses space H, the task is to find a hypothesis
H ∈ H that is consistent with the examples, i.e. H(e) = C(e) for all e ∈ E . The hypoth-
esis space H consists of the set of all the possible hypotheses a specific ML algorithm can
generate. For example, if using a decision tree learner, the hypothesis space is the set of all
possible decision trees. This is the specification of Boolean inductive concept learning, such
as used in [39].
However, for practical reasons, the learnt hypotheses are not usually required to classify
the examples perfectly, but just with a high accuracy. Thus, in the remainder of this paper we
will measure the “consistency” of a hypothesis with respect to a case-base E based on some
performance measure, such as precision and recall, or classification accuracy. The higher the
performance measure of a hypothesis, the more consistent it is. Additionally, in this paper we
consider the set of training examples known to an agent to be a case-base, like in case-based
reasoning (CBR) systems [1], rather than a simple training set. The reason is that, as we will
see, agents do not discard the training examples after learning as often done in inductive ML
once the hypothesis is learnt, but keep them for future use.1
Multiagent inductive learning (MAIL) focuses on scenarios in which a collection of agents
with inductive learning capabilities attempt to learn the same task from potentially different
sets of examples. A typical example of MAIL is distributed rule learning, where a collection
of agents independently explore different parts of a large dataset, learning rules on their
own, and later attempt to coordinate to verify that the rules learned by each of them are in
agreement by the data seen to all of them. For example, the work of Provost and Hennessy
in the DRL system [49], or that of Davies and Edwards [21] follow exactly this approach.
There are, however, many other tasks that fall in the MAIL category. In this paper we will
focus on the task of CIL, but MAIL covers other tasks—such as deliberative agreement [41]
or concept convergence [42].
The intuitive idea of CIL is to collaborate so that the hypotheses learnt by every agent are
consistent with the data known to all the agents. Specifically, CIL is defined as follows:
1 Having a case-base does no imply simply retaining all examples forever; there are techniques for reducing
the case-base to a manageable size, as shown in [40,53].
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Definition 1 (Coordinated inductive learning)
Given: a multiagent systemA = {A1, . . . , An}, where each agent has an individual case-
base E1, . . . , En with examples drawn from an example space E , a shared target binary
concept C : E → {+,−}, and a shared hypotheses space H,
Find: for each agent Ai a hypothesis Hi ∈ H such that Hi is consistent with all the
case-bases E1, . . . , En .
We say that a hypotheses Hi is coordinated with respect to a multiagent system A when
Hi is consistent with all case-bases of the agents in A. As mentioned above, we measure
consistency based on some measure of performance, such as precision and recall, or accuracy.
Thus, the higher the performance of a hypothesis (with respect to the set of case-bases of the
agents) the more coordinated the hypothesis. Moreover, notice that, as defined above, instead
of learning a single agreed-upon hypothesis, each agent in a MAS will learn a, potentially
different, hypothesis.2
For instance, imagine that two agents, A1 and A2, want to learn the concept of chairs so as
to distinguish them from other kinds of pieces of furniture. Each agent has seen a particular
collection pieces of furniture (examples), and some of these examples were labelled as chairs
while others were labeled as not-chairs—this collection of examples or cases form their two
individual case-bases E1 and E2. A hypotheses generated by one of the agents, say A1, could
be: H1 = “All examples with 4 legs and a seat are chairs,” which is consistent with E1. If
agent A2 has examples of chairs in E2 that have a seat but not four legs, then hypothesis H1
does not classify them correctly, and therefore H1 is not consistent with the case-base E2;
thus, H1 is not coordinated with respect to A = {A1, A2}.
The framework presented in this paper deals only with binary classification tasks. A
multi-class classification problem defined by a labeling function F : E → S, where S =
{s1, . . . , sk} is a finite set of class labels, will be divided into a set of k binary classification
problems, one for each solution si , where all examples with label si will be considered
positive, and the rest of examples will be considered negative examples. The experiments
presented in this paper using multi-class datasets use this procedure.
3 A-MAIL
This section explains in detail the Argumentation-based Multi-Agent Inductive Learning
(A-MAIL) approach. The two main ideas behind A-MAIL are
1. that an argumentation-based communication among a group of agents is sufficient for
achieving CIL, and
2. that the arguments exchanged during the communication process can be inductively
generated from (and evaluated against) examples.
Agents using A-MAIL use induction to generate hypotheses explaining the examples known to
them, and then communicate those hypotheses to other agents. Agreements and disagreements
over those hypotheses are elucidated by an argumentation process. There are three main
processes or components in the A-MAIL approach:
The induction process where the agents hypotheses are induced from examples in indi-
vidual case-bases (these individual hypotheses are later interpreted as arguments).
2 This is defined in this way mainly for generality and avoiding over-constraining the problem, since the
situation where we are interested in finding a single agreed-upon hypothesis for all agents is just a special case
of this where we add an additional constraint forcing all the hypotheses to be the same.
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The argumentation process where induction-generated arguments are exchanged, con-
trasted, and attacked.
The hypothesis revision process where hypotheses generated by induction are revised in
face of the new arguments received from other agents.
A-MAIL represents hypotheses learnt by induction as a collection of classification rules (as
is common in inductive concept learning). A rule α = ⟨r, s⟩ has two parts, a condition r
and a positive or negative label s ∈ {+,−}. A rule with s = + means that examples that
satisfy the condition r belong to the solution class C , while a rule with s = − means that
examples that satisfy the condition r do no belong to the solution class C . Since A-MAIL
only learns rules covering examples belonging to C , all the rules in a hypothesis have s = +.
The condition r may be represented differently depending on the specific formalism used to
represent examples. In our experimental evaluation, we used Feature Terms [14], but other
formalisms such as Horn Clauses, common in Inductive Logic Programming [29] can be
used. A-MAIL only assumes that r is a generalization in a generalization space G.
Definition 2 (Generalization space)
A generalization space is a pair ⟨G,⊑⟩, where G is a set, and ⊑ is a partial order over G.
Intuitively,⊑ represents the subsumption relation (or “more general or equal than” relation)
between two generalizations. We write r ⊑ e or α ⊑ e when an example e satisfies the
condition r of a rule α, and we say that α subsumes e (or, alternatively, that α covers e).3
Given two rules α1 = ⟨r1, s⟩ and α2 = ⟨r2, s′⟩ (such that s = s′) we say that α1 is more
general or equal than α2 whenever r1 ⊑ r2 (the condition of the first subsumes the condition
of the other); we can also use the notation α1 ⊑ α2 and say the first rule α1 subsumes the
second rule α2. We will write α1 ! α2 when α1 is strictly more general than α2. A hypothesis
H = {α1, . . . ,αn} subsumes an example e (H ⊑ e) when at least one of its rules αi subsumes
e. Once a hypothesis H has been learned, an agent will classify a new incoming example as
C if it is covered by H , and as ¬C if it is not.
In the example above, where agents were interested in learning to classify pieces of
furniture into chairs and non-chairs (where the target concept C is “chair”), one rule could
be: α1 = ⟨“examples with 4 legs”,+⟩, α2 = ⟨“examples with 4 legs and a seat”,+⟩, Here,
clearly α1 ⊑ α2, since all the examples that are subsumed by α2 are also subsumed by α1.
Figure 1 shows how the three processes of Induction, Argumentation, and Hypothesis
Revision interact inside one agent (the agent is shown as a the dotted box); then this agent
communicates with other agents by exchanging arguments (shown outside the dotted box).
The Goal square in Fig. 1 specifies the purpose of the argumentation process and when it is
achieved, which in the context of this paper is CIL.
In summary, in a multiagent systemA = {A1, . . . , An}A-MAIL uses these three processes
as follows:
(a) Each agent Ai performs induction individually from its case-base Ei , obtaining a hypoth-
esis Hi .
(b) The n agents communicate their hypotheses to each other, so all agents know H1 . . . Hn .
The set of rules in hypothesis Hi , when communicated, is understood as a set of argu-
ments.
3 Notice that in description logics notation, subsumption is written in the reverse order since it is seen as
“set inclusion” of their interpretations. In ML terms, A ⊑ B means that A is more general than B, while in
description logics it represents the opposite.
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Induction
Case Base
GoalHypotheses Arguments
Hypothesis 
Revision Argumentation Arguments
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Agents
Agent
Fig. 1 Processes involved in the A-MAIL approach. The left side box labeled ‘Agent’ contains the processes
of Induction, Argumentation and Hypothesis Revision internal to one individual agent; only arguments are
exchanged with a cloud of other agents
(c) For every agent Ai , the argumentation process consists of attacking the hypotheses of
others that are not consistent with its case-base Ei and defending its hypothesis Hi when
arguments attacking the rules in Hi are received. The computational argumentation
model establishes when an argument attacked by another argument is defeated or not.4
(d) When an agent Ai has an argument that is defeated according to its own argumentation
model, the rule in Hi corresponding to that argument is no longer valid. Then, Ai performs
a hypothesis revision process to find a new Hi that is consistent with its case-base Ei
and with the current state of the argumentation (essentially, undefeated arguments sent
by other agents).
This overall A-MAIL process continues until agents have achieved CIL (this is elaborated in
Sect. 4). Moreover, notice that A-MAIL is a general process, which subsumes scenarios like
having agents with zero initial knowledge (empty case bases), and another agent “teaching”
the first agent via argumentation (an empirical evaluation of this scenario is presented in Sect.
5.5).
Also, we note that A-MAIL can be instantiated with different argumentation approaches,
inductive learning algorithms and hypothesis revision procedures. In order to make the paper
self-contained we will present a specific instantiation of A-MAIL able to perform CIL, in
which three specific components are presented in the following three subsections.
3.1 Argumentation model
The first component of A-MAIL is an argumentation model that allows agents to exchange,
contrast, and attack their hypotheses. Many argumentation approaches have been presented
in the literature, including abstract argumentation frameworks such as Dung’s [22] (where the
internal structure of arguments is not considered) or those based on logic such as Besnard and
Hunter’s [7] or Chesñevar and Simari’s [17] (where arguments contain logical formulae, for
example, in classical logic). The standard definition of an abstract argumentation framework
4 Each agent has an individual argumentation model, and there is no “global” argumentation model. Thus,
the appraisal on which arguments are deemed as accepted or defeated will vary from one individual agent to
another.
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was given by Dung as a pair AF = ⟨Q, R⟩ composed of a set of arguments Q and an
attack relation R among the arguments [22], the goal of an argumentation framework is to
determine which sets of arguments are accepted and which are defeated. The argumentation
model presented in this paper differs from most of those models in several key aspects,
required for its integration with A-MAIL:
1. Arguments are generated form examples: our argumentation model is not abstract (like in
some argumentation frameworks, such as Dung’s) but contain examples and generaliza-
tions, since we are dealing with inductive ML tasks. Specifically, our model distinguishes
two different kind of arguments: rule-arguments and example-arguments, which have a
different treatment.
2. Open-ended argumentation: we assume an open-ended set of arguments. In most frame-
works the set of arguments Q is assumed to be fixed and given beforehand. In A-MAIL,
the set of arguments is open, and might grow during the argumentation process, as agents
generate new arguments from examples. Notice that it would be computationally unfeasi-
ble to request agents to generate in advance all possible arguments that can be generated
from examples.
3. Decentralized: while in most classic frameworks there is a single set of arguments Q, and
argumentation is performed in a centralized way,5 argumentation in A-MAIL is used as a
communication framework, where each agent in the system has its own individual model
of the argumentation process, potentially disagreeing on which arguments are accepted
or defeated.
There has been work on argumentation frameworks that deal with some of the differences
raised above, such as on general argumentation frameworks that are decentralized [57]; our
approach however focuses only on argumentation over generalizations based on empirically
supported arguments. The rest of this section presents an argumentation approach specifi-
cally designed for A-MAIL for the purpose of achieving CIL (this argumentation approach
should not be considered as a general theory of argumentation, but just as an application of
argumentation concepts in order to achieve CIL). Our approach borrows ideas from several
of the above mentioned argumentation approaches to suit the requirements of A-MAIL.
3.1.1 Arguments in A-MAIL
We will consider two kinds of arguments:
Definition 3 (Example-argument)
An example-argument α = ⟨e,C(e)⟩ is a pair where e is an example, and C(e) ∈ {+,−};
where C(e) = + if e is a positive example of C , and C(e) = −when e is a negative example
of C .
Definition 4 (Rule-argument)
A rule-argument α = ⟨r, s⟩ is a rule where r is the condition of the rule and s ∈ {+,−} is
the solution predicted by the rule with respet to C .
In A-MAIL, rule-arguments are generated using inductive learning. To determine the qual-
ity of a given argument, we define a confidence measure for rule-arguments relative to indi-
vidual agents:
5 A notable exception to that is the work of [20], where they study how a collection of Dung’s style argumen-
tation systems can be merged.
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Definition 5 (Confidence)
The confidence of a rule-argument α = ⟨r, s⟩ for an agent Ai is:
Bi (α) = |{e ∈ Ei |C(e) = s ∧ r ⊑ e}| + 1|{e ∈ Ei |r ⊑ e}| + 2
where Bi (α) is the ratio between the number of examples covered by r with solution class s
and the total number examples from Ai ’s case-base Ei covered by r . We add 1 to the numerator
and 2 to the denominator following the Laplace correction [34, p. 226], which basically
achieves avoiding extreme confidence values when computing from very few samples. In the
rest of this paper we will use the terms positive examples or endorsing examples to refer to
examples that are covered by a rule-argument and support the same solution as the argument,
and negative examples or counterexamples to the examples that are covered, but support a
different solution.
Definition 6 (τ -acceptability)
A rule-argument α = ⟨r, s⟩ is τ -acceptable for an agent Ai if Bi (α) ≥ τ , where 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1.
By convention, all example-arguments are τ -acceptable.
Given an agreed upon threshold τ , only those arguments that are τ -acceptable for the agent
who generated them are allowed in the argumentation. Arguments that are not τ -acceptable
for the agent who generated them must be withdrawn from the argumentation. However,
that doesn’t guarantee that all arguments in the argumentation are τ -acceptable to every
other agent. In the remainder of this paper we will assume all agents share an agreed upon
threshold τ , studying situations where each agent might use a different value for τ is part of
our future work.
Notice that it is possible to construct a rule argument corresponding to each example
argument (i.e. a rule-argument that only covers one example). Thus, it might seem that
example-arguments are not required. However, considering both types of arguments is useful
in that it allows us to treat examples and rules differently (rule-arguments can be attacked and
require a minimal amount of support, whereas examples do not require additional support,
and cannot be attacked).
3.1.2 Attacking arguments
Arguments can be attacked by other arguments, as follows:
Definition 7 (Attack)
The attack relation (α " β) among arguments α and β holds whenever:
1. ⟨r1, s⟩" ⟨r2, s′⟩ ⇐⇒ s ̸= s′ ∧ r2 ! r1, or
2. ⟨e,C(e)⟩" ⟨r, s⟩ ⇐⇒ C(e) ̸= s ∧ r ⊑ e
In other words, a rule-argument α = ⟨r1, s⟩ only attacks another rule-argument β = ⟨r2, s′⟩
supporting the opposite solution (s ̸= s′) when r2 ! r1, i.e. when β is a strictly more general
argument than α. Notice that this definition, designed specifically for empirical argumen-
tation, where more specific arguments attack more general arguments, has the interesting
side effect of avoiding the creation of cycles in the attack relation (which greatly reduces the
computational complexity of argumentation). Similarly, an example-argument α = ⟨e,C(e)⟩
only attacks a rule argument β = ⟨r, s⟩, if β covers α but they support a different solution.
In this case, we call the example e a counterexample of β.
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Fig. 2 An illustration of the different argument types, their confidences and relations
Fig. 2 shows an exemplification of several arguments generated by an agent Ai , where
positive examples are represented as ⊕, negative examples are represented as ⊖, and rule-
arguments are represented as ellipsoids containing (covering) examples. Here argument α1
supports +, covers 3 positive examples and 3 negative examples, and has confidence 0.5,
while argument α2 supports−with confidence 0.8, since it only covers 3 negative examples.
The attack α2 " α1 holds because α2 supports−, α1 supports + and r1 ! r2. Two example-
arguments (e1 and e2) are highlighted in Fig. 2: e1 endorses α1 while e2 attacks α1.
Given a set of arguments, we will use the notion of dialectical trees [17] to determine
which of those arguments is defeated, and which accepted.6 Moreover, we use an adapted
version of dialectical trees that consider rules and examples separately; to avoid confusions
due to this difference, we will call them argumentation trees, rather than dialectical trees,
from now on.
Definition 8 (Argumentation line)
An argumentation line αn " αn−1 " . . . " α1 is a sequence of τ -acceptable arguments
where αi attacks αi−1. We call α1 the root.
Notice that example-arguments can only appear as the left-most argument (e.g. αn) in an
argumentation line, since they cannot be attacked.
Definition 9 (Argumentation tree)
An α-rooted argumentation tree T is a tree where each path from the root argument α to one
of the leaves is an α-rooted argumentation line. The example-free argumentation tree T f
corresponding to T is simply the tree resulting from removing all the example-arguments
present as leaves in T .
Any set of argumentation lines rooted in the same argument α1 can be represented as an
argumentation tree. The children of an argument αi in an argumentation tree T are all the
arguments α j in T such that α j " αi . Notice that in an argumentation tree all the example-
arguments appear in the leaves. Moreover, although we include example-arguments in the
argumentation trees for convenience (they capture the state of the argumentation), example-
arguments, in our framework, only modify the confidence of rule arguments (and thus, their
τ -acceptability). To determine which arguments are accepted or defeated in an argumentation
tree, only the rule-arguments are used —i.e. only example-free argumentation trees are used.
6 In fact, the model presented in this paper is compatible with Dung’s preferred or grounded extension
semantics (which are actually equivalent to dialectical trees when, as in our case, the attack relation has no
cycles).
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Fig. 3 Empiricist marking function of an argumentation tree T by an agent Ai
3.1.3 Marking functions
Given an argumentation tree, an agent determines which arguments are defeated or accepted
by means of a marking function [51], which marks each rule-argument in a tree as either A
(accepted) or D (defeated).7 In this paper, we will consider two different marking functions:
a rationalist marking function and an empiricist marking function. These two marking func-
tions correspond to two different criteria for defining defeat in a multiagent system setting
of learning from communication:
– The empiricist principle relies on the examples available to an individual to determine
argument acceptability: if an argument α is not τ -acceptable for an empiricist agent Ai ,
then Ai will consider α defeated (regardless of the argumentation state).
– The rationalist principle, however, relies solely on the argumentation state to determine
which arguments are accepted (if marked A) or defeated (if marked D).8
We define a marking function as a function M that assigns a label, A (accepted), or D
(defeated), to each argument in an example-free argumentation tree T f for a given agent Ai .
We will write M(T f ,α, Ai ) ∈ {A,D} to denote the label assigned to argument α in tree T f
by a marking function M .
The empiricist marking function M E for an agent Ai and an example-free argumentation
tree T f is defined as follows:
1. All the rule arguments in T f that are not τ -acceptable for Ai are marked D (defeated).
2. All unmarked leaf arguments in T f are marked A (accepted).
3. Every unmarked inner argument α in T f is marked A (accepted) if all α’s children are
marked D; otherwise, α is marked D (defeated).
Intuitively, an empiricist agent Ai considers that all arguments that are not τ -acceptable for
Ai itself are not acceptable. That is why in step 1 they are marked as defeated, regardless
of whether they are defeated or not by some other arguments. Fig. 3 illustrates this process
in a situation where there are two agents, Ai and A j , where arguments αk are generated by
Ai , and arguments βk are generated by A j . In this example, all the arguments in the tree are
τ -acceptable for Ai , except β2, that is τ -acceptable only for A j .
The rationalist marking function M R for an agent Ai and an example-free argumentation
tree T f is defined as follows.
7 There are other approaches, like categorizers, to mark argument trees; they are discussed later in Sect. 7.
8 Thus, a rationalist agent Ai might consider an argument α to be accepted when marked A, even if it is not
τ -acceptable for Ai .
123
Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst
Fig. 4 Rationalist marking function of an argumentation tree T by an agent Ai
Fig. 5 Illustration of the local
point of view of two agents in
A-MAIL
1. All the rule arguments in T f that are not τ -acceptable for Ai , but for which Ai can
still generate additional attacking arguments not currently in the tree T, are marked D
(defeated).
2. All unmarked leaf arguments in T f are marked A (accepted).
3. Every unmarked inner argument α in T f is marked A (accepted) if all of α’s children are
marked D, otherwise, α is marked D (defeated).
Notice that the only difference with the empiricist marking function is in the first step. For
a rationalist agent Ai , if an argument cannot be defeated in the argumentation model, then
such argument is deemed to be accepted, even if it is not τ -acceptable for Ai . So, a not
τ -acceptable argument is not directly considered defeated; it is only considered defeated as
long as there are still attacks that can be performed against it. Once a rationalist agent Ai has
exhausted all of the attacks it can generate against a given argument, Ai will consider that
argument to be accepted (while an empiricist agent would still consider it defeated).
Fig. 4 illustrates this process with the same example as in Fig. 3. β2 is not τ -acceptable
for Ai , but since it is accepted given the argumentation framework, Ai considers β2 accepted
in this rationalist view, and therefore the root argument α1 is marked as defeated. Thus, in
this case M R(T f ,α1, Ai ) = D.
Intuitively, empiricist agents need to be shown empirical evidence (examples) of an argu-
ment before accepting it (an idea closer to classical ML), while the rationalist agent accepts
what it cannot defeat (an idea closer to standard computational argumentation frameworks).
Section 4 formally describes the interaction protocol of A-MAIL. Nevertheless, let us first
illustrate the argumentation framework inside of A-MAIL with a simple example using a
rationalist marking function. Fig. 5 shows two agents, A1 and A2, discussing an argument
α1, generated by A1. Dotted lines indicate when an agent communicates an argument to
another agent. At the beginning, at time t = 0, A1 generates α1 and finds it τ -acceptable.
Then, at time t = 1, A1 communicates α1 to agent A2. A2 does not find α1 τ -acceptable,
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Fig. 6 State of an agent Ai in A-MAIL, including the case-base Ei , the set of rule-arguments Ri proposed by
Ai to be part of a hypothesis, Hi the current hypothesis, and Gi , the set of arguments exchanged with other
agents while arguing about the rules in Ri
thus A2 tries to generate a counterargument for it, and succeeds (generating β1). Because of
these two facts, since A2 is using a rationalist marking function, α1 is marked as defeated
(D). Finally, at time t = 2, A2 communicates the attack β1 " α1 to agent A1. Since A1 finds
β1 τ -acceptable, A1 now considers α1 to be defeated.
This short example shows how, at any given time in A-MAIL, each agent might know a
different set of arguments, and might consider a different subset of arguments as accepted.
The goal of the argumentation process is to let the agents reach an agreement over which
arguments are accepted.
3.2 Argumentation-consistent induction
The second component (as shown in Fig. 1) of the A-MAIL framework is an induction method
for generating an inductive hypothesis from examples.
Let us start by introducing the information known by an agent Ai in A-MAIL, represented
as a tuple ⟨Ei , Ri , Hi , Gi ⟩ (as shown in Fig. 6), where:
1. Ei the case-base of Ai , contains all the examples known to Ai .
2. Ri the set of rules (arguments) that Ai has generated, up to now, from the case-base Ei
to be part of its hypothesis Hi (regardless of its current status as accepted or defeated).
3. Hi the current hypothesis held by agent Ai , composed of all the arguments in Ri accepted
by Ai , i.e. Hi = {α ∈ Ri | M(T fα ,α, Ei ) = A}, where Tα is the argumentation tree with
root α.
4. Gi the set of arguments (either rule-arguments or example-arguments) send to or received
from the other agents that have not yet been withdrawn (i.e. that are still considered
τ -acceptable by the agents who generated them). Notice that this is basically all the
arguments in the trees rooted in each α ∈ Ri . Thus, Ri ⊆ Gi .
Recall that all arguments in Gi must be considered τ -acceptable by the agent who generated
them; otherwise, those arguments cannot be part of the argumentation, and must be withdrawn
from Gi , as described in the hypothesis revision process section below.
The case-bases of the agents are private, but Ri and Gi of each agent is public (since those
are the messages they will exchange during argumentation). Thus, in addition to their state,
each agent can infer the following:
1. G = ⋃i=1...n Gi (the set of all arguments exchanged up to now, where n is the number
of agents).
2. Qi = {α ∈ G | M(T fα ,α, Ei ) = A} (the set of rule arguments that are considered as
accepted by Ai ).
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3. Ii = {α ∈ G | M(T fα ,α, Ei ) = D ∧ Bi (α) < τ } (the set of arguments that are
considered both defeated by Ai and not τ -acceptable by Ai ; notice that Ii corresponds to
the set of arguments that Ai is interested in attacking.)
4. Eci = {e ∈ Ei | C(e) = + ∧ ∃α ∈ Hi : α ⊑ e} (the set of positive examples of C
covered by the hypothesis Hi ).
5. Eui = {e ∈ Ei | C(e) = + ∧ !α ∈ Hi : α ⊑ e} (the set of positive examples of C not
covered by the hypothesis Hi .
Given that knowledge, agents in A-MAIL should be capable of generating two kinds of
arguments: (1) generating a hypothesis from examples, and (2) generating attacks to specific
arguments of other agents. Moreover, both hypotheses and attacks need to be consistent with
the set of arguments Qi known to the agent. Thus, agents need to perform argumentation-
consistent induction [39], i.e. induction of rules from examples taking into account the set
of accepted arguments. Classic rule learning algorithms, like CN2 [18] or FOIL [50] can
perform induction, but not argumentation-consistent induction. For that reason, we present
next an induction algorithm, ABUI, that can perform such tasks.
3.2.1 ABUI
The Argumentation-based Bottom-Up Induction (ABUI) algorithm is an algorithm designed
to perform argumentation-consistent induction, and can be used in A-MAIL for generating
both hypotheses and attacks. ABUI is a bottom-up rule induction algorithm which, in addition
to examples, accepts supplemental background knowledge (in the form of a set of arguments)
that constrains its search for generalizations.
As shown in Fig. 7, the input parameters of ABUI are: a case-base Ei , a target solution
s ∈ {+,−}, a set of accepted arguments Qi , and a rule condition g ∈ G. The output is a rule
⟨r, s⟩ (if it exists) such that:
ABUI(Ei , s, g, Qi ) = ⟨r, s⟩ : (g ⊑ r) ∧ (Bi (r) ≥ τ ) ∧ (̸ ∃α ∈ Qi : α " ⟨r, s⟩)
that is to say, (1) r is more specific than g, (2) ⟨r, s⟩ is τ -acceptable with respect to Ei , and
(3) ⟨r, s⟩ is not attacked by any argument in Qi . The combination of inputs s and g can be
used to direct ABUI in searching for rules that attack a particular argument.
Specifically, the ABUI algorithm, shown in Fig. 8, works as follows. First ABUI computes
a set of seeds, which initially contains each example in E which is covered by g and has
solution s. ABUI works on top of a generalization refinement operator γ that is able to
Fig. 7 ABUI is an inductive concept learning algorithm which can take additional background knowledge,
in the form of arguments, into account. Specifically, the inputs are: a set of positive, E+i , and negative, E
−
i ,
examples; a target solution s; a set of arguments Qi , and a rule condition g. ABUI generates, if it exists,
a τ -acceptable rule more specific than g, that is not attacked by any argument in Qi , and that supports the
solution s
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Fig. 8 Algorithm that finds a
τ -acceptable rule ⟨r, s⟩, which is
more specific than g, and is not
attacked by any argument in Q;
⊥ is the most general condition
for a rule (i.e. the one that covers
all of the examples)
generate generalizations9 of a given rule in the generalization space G. Using this operator,
ABUI generalizes each seed e step by step in order to generate candidate rules: first, the
current rule ⟨c, s⟩ is initialized to be equal to a rule which only covers the seed example e.
Then, at each step, all the generalizations of the current rule condition c are obtained using
γ , and those resulting rules that are more specific than g but not under the attack of any
argument in Q, are added to the set G ′. The rule with highest confidence (Definition 5) in
G ′ is the one selected to be the current rule in the next step. When G ′ becomes empty, the
process ends, and ABUI moves on to generalize the next seed. During this process, each
time the current rule is τ -acceptable, it is added to the set H . When all the seeds have been
generalized, the rule ⟨r, s⟩ ∈ H with maximum confidence is returned by ABUI. If H is
empty then the algorithm returns a failure token.
The two argument generation capabilities required by A-MAIL (generating hypotheses and
generating attacks) can be achieved by ABUI as explained in the two following subsections,
while using ABUI for hypothesis revision process is explained in Sect. 3.3.
3.2.2 Hypothesis generation
ABUI generates argumentation-consistent rules. Thus, since a hypothesis is composed of a
set of rules, in order to generate a hypothesis, ABUI needs to be called several times. When
an agent Ai , before starting A-MAIL wants to generate a hypothesis for the target concept C
from a given set of examples Ei , the following process is used:
1. H := ∅, E := Ei
2. r := ABUI(Ei ,+,∅,⊥). Where ⊥ represents the most general rule condition in the
generalization space (a condition which covers all the examples)—i.e. we are not asking
ABUI to constraint the search to attack any particular argument, but just to generate rules
that cover the positive examples. Also, notice that the third parameter, Qi , is ∅ because
agents only need to generate hypotheses before starting A-MAIL, and thus before any
argument has been exchanged.
3. If ABUI returns an error token (either because E does not contain any positive example
of C , or because no τ -acceptable rule r can be found), the process is over and the current
H is returned as the hypothesis for concept C .
9 In this context, a generalization refinement operator [27] is a function that given a rule condition r ∈ G,
returns a set of generalizations of the rule condition r , which cover a larger set of examples than r did. For the
experiments reported in this paper, we used the generalization operator defined in [44].
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sponge
external-features
spiculate-skeleton spiculate-skeleton
megascleres megascleres
line-form
form:
external-features
growing
growing
line-form
Target concept C = Axinellida
sponge
external-features
spiculate-skeleton
spiculate-skeleton
megascleres
line-form
form:
external-features
consistency
hand
growing growing
line-form
consistency
hand
megascleres
smooth-form
characteristics megas-form
characteristics
shaft shaft
branching
branching
Fig. 9 Two example rules generated by ABUI in the demospongiae dataset used in our experiments
4. Otherwise, H := H ∪ {r}, E := {e ∈ E |r ̸⊑ e}, and the process returns to step 2. In other
words, the newly found rule r is added to the current hypothesis H , and all the examples
covered by the new rule r are removed from the set of examples E .
Moreover, notice that this process is only used once, before starting A-MAIL. After this
point, hypotheses are revised by the hypothesis revision process, described in Sect. 3.3.
Rule β2 shown in Fig. 9 is an example rule generated by ABUI when trying to generate
a hypothesis for the target concept Axinellidae in the demospongiae dataset (from the UCI
machine learning repository) used in our experiments. This dataset is a multi-class clas-
sification problem, and thus in order to use A-MAIL and ABUI, we turn it into k binary
classification tasks, one for each different solution class in the dataset. Here, rule β2 states
that sponges with a “branching line-form” in a “growing” of the “external features”, and that
have “megascleres” in their “spiculate skeleton”, belong to the Axinellidae solution class.
3.2.3 Attack generation
When an agent Ai wants to attack a rule-argumentα, given a the set Qi of arguments accepted
by agent Ai , ABUI is used to find a τ -acceptable argument β such that β " α in the following
way:
(i) If α = ⟨r,+⟩, then β := ABUI(Ei ,−, Qi , r), and if α = ⟨r,−⟩, then β :=
ABUI(Ei ,+, Qi , r). Passing r as the last parameter ensures that β will be more specific
than α (and thus β will attack α).
(ii) If ABUI returns a τ -acceptable rule-argumentβ, thenβ will be used in the attackβ " α.
(iii) If ABUI fails to find a τ -acceptable rule-argument, then Ai looks if there are examples
in the case-base Ei that attack α. If so, one such example is randomly chosen to be used
as an example-argument to attack α.
Otherwise, Ai is unable to attack α. Notice that, in order to defend an argument α against the
attack of another argument β, an agent simply has to search for an argument that attacks β.
Therefore, the key idea behind ABUI is to use the set of accepted arguments in the current
state of the argumentation in order to constrain the search for rules in the generalization
space. ABUI generates rules to be used by argumentation, and the argumentation model
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decides which rules are accepted or not, pruning down the search space of ABUI to contain
only those rules consistent with the argumentation. This is the key notion used in A-MAIL to
integrate induction with argumentation.
Figure 9 shows two rules β2 and γ6, where γ6 is a rule-argument generated to attack
argument β2. As we can see, the left-hand side of the rule γ6 is a more specific condition than
the one in rule β2, and also the solution predicted by the rule γ6 (−) is not the one predicted
by β2 (+).
3.3 Hypothesis revision process
The third component of the A-MAIL framework is the hypothesis revision process, that is
in charge of revising the state ⟨Ei , Ri , Hi , Gi ⟩ of an agent Ai in face of new information
coming from other agents. Specifically, the hypothesis revision process in A-MAIL has two
functions:
1. Ensure that (a) all the rules in Gi are τ -acceptable by the agents that generated them
(otherwise, they have to be withdrawn) and (b) all the rules in the hypothesis Hi held by
an agent are both τ -acceptable and marked as accepted in the argumentation model of
Ai .
2. Generate new rules to replace any rule in the hypothesis Hi that has been defeated during
argumentation.
The hypothesis revision process of an agent is triggered each time a new (rule- or example-)
argument is received from another agent. The hypothesis revision process might trigger
the inductive learning algorithm of an agent (e.g. ABUI) to learn new rules that substitute
those rules that are no longer accepted. For example, if at a particular time Ai learns a new
example that renders an argument α ∈ Ri no longer τ -acceptable, then α cannot be part of
the hypothesis Hi anymore, and Ai needs to withdraw α, and generate a new rule (or rules)
to cover all the positive examples left uncovered by α.
Revision over New Example-Arguments When an agent Ai receives an example-argument
⟨e,C(e)⟩ from another agent A j , hypothesis revision proceeds as follows:
1. Ai adds e to the local case-base Ei , and reevaluates the τ -acceptability of the arguments
in Gi . Ai determines which arguments in Gi that were previously τ -acceptable have
become not τ -acceptable; then Ai withdraws those arguments from Gi and notifies all
the other agents of this change.
2. Then, since the set of arguments that are considered τ -acceptable might have changed, Ai
uses the marking function (either rationalist or empiricist) to mark again which arguments
in Gi are accepted or defeated.10
3. Accordingly, the number of arguments in the hypothesis Hi might have decreased (if any
argument previously in Hi has been marked as defeated (D) or is no longer τ -acceptable),
and thus the number of uncovered examples Eui might have increased. Therefore, the
agent may need to induce new rules for completing the hypothesis Hi . For this purpose,
ABUI is called as follows: ABUI(Eui ∪ E−i ,+, Qi ,⊥); i.e. ABUI is called with the union
of Eui and all the negative examples in Ei , to inductively generate new rules until they
cover the uncovered examples Eui while being consistent with the accepted arguments in
Qi .
10 Notice that the previous step updates τ -acceptability, assessed based on which examples are covered by
each argument, while this step updates the marking of each argument, determined using a marking function
over the argumentation tree.
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Revision over New Rule-Arguments: When an agent Ai receives from another agent A j
an attack β " α (where β is a rule-argument attacking an argument α generated by Ai ),
hypothesis revision proceeds as follows:
1. Ai uses the marking function (either rationalist or empiricist) to reassess the arguments
in Gi .
2. Accordingly, the arguments now in the hypothesis Hi might have decreased, and thus the
uncovered examples Eui might have increased. In the same way as in Step 3 above, the
agent has to induce new rules for completing the hypothesis Hi .
Moreover, notice that only arguments that are considered not τ -acceptable anymore are
withdrawn (which means removing them completely from the argumentation process). Argu-
ments that are marked as defeated by the marking function but that are still τ -acceptable,
although they cannot be part of a hypothesis Hi , are not withdrawn, but kept into the argu-
mentation system.
Finally, notice that the hypothesis revision process triggers the induction process when-
ever needed, in order to maintain the internal consistency of the agents’ hypotheses and
what the agents know from experience (the initial case-base) and from communication (the
received arguments). Hypothesis revision, thus, is used to integrate the information provided
by argumentation (which arguments are accepted or not) into the knowledge state of the
agent.
4 Coordinated Inductive Learning using A-MAIL
Articulating the three processes of A-MAIL (inductive learning, argumentation and hypothe-
sis revision) to achieve CIL requires an interaction protocol, which can also be formalized as
a dialogue game [26,47]. The CIL protocol consists of a series of rounds. In the first round,
t = 0, every agent Ai ∈ A performs individual induction over their initial case-bases Ei and
generates an initial hypothesis H0i . In later rounds, the protocol works in a round-robin fash-
ion, where agents take turns generating more arguments, trying to defend their arguments
from the attacks of the other agents, or trying to attack arguments generated by the other
agents which are not τ -acceptable to them.
We will write ⟨Eti , Rti , Hti , Gti ⟩ to represent the state of an agent Ai at round t . At each
round of the protocol, one agent holds a token, and can either assert new arguments, withdraw
arguments (due to hypothesis revision), or accept the current state of the argumentation before
the token is passed on to the next agent. This cycle continues until no agent generates any
new argument (either because the current individual hypotheses are τ -acceptable to all the
agents, or because they are unable to reach an agreement).
The protocol for a multiagent system A = {A1, . . . , An} is defined below. Notice that,
technically, we have 2 protocols: one for rationalist agents and one for empiricist agents.
However, since they only differ in that steps 3 and 4 are only performed by empiricist agents,
we present only the empiricist protocol; the rationalist protocol is the same but skipping
steps 3 and 4.
The CIL (Empiricist) Protocol
1. Starting at round t = 0 every agent Ai ∈ A performs induction over its case-base Ei ,
obtaining an initial hypothesis H0i , which is communicated to the rest of the agents inA.
The token is given to one agent at random, and the protocol moves to step 2.
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2. Let agent Ai be the one with the token. If Ai can generate an argument β attacking some
argument α ∈ I ti , then Ai sends attack β " α to the other agents, and the protocol moves
to 5. Otherwise, the protocol moves to step 3 for empiricist agents.11
3. For empiricist agents only: If there is an argument α ∈ I ti for which Ai cannot find any
attack, then Ai sends a message to the agent A j who generated α, requesting an endorsing
example of α, and the protocol moves to step 4.
4. For empiricist agents only: A j selects a (new) endorsing example of α and sends it to Ai .
The protocol moves to step 5.
5. If Ai has a positive example e ∈ Ei such that, for another agent A j , Htj ̸⊑ e (i.e. A j ’s
current hypothesis does not cover e), Ai will send ⟨e,C(e)⟩ to agent A j (since e is positive,
C(e) = +). The protocol moves to step 6.
6. Every agent that has received an argument or an example during this round performs
hypothesis revision and communicates any changes about its updated hypotheses to the
other agents. The protocol then moves to step 7.
7. If Gt = Gt−n (i.e. no agent has sent any new argument in the last n rounds) the protocol
ends. Otherwise a new round t + 1 starts, the token is given to the next agent, and the
protocol moves to step 2.
In order to ensure termination, no message is allowed to be sent twice by the same agent,
i.e. arguments that have already been sent are not permitted to be sent again. Notice that this
means that once an argument has been withdrawn, an agent cannot bring that argument back
to the argumentation framework.12 Moreover, notice that rule-arguments are broadcast, i.e.
sent to all agents, so that any agent can attack or defend arguments sent by other agents,
whereas example-arguments are only sent privately to one agent. This reduces the number
of examples exchanged. There is no shared blackboard, nor any other shared repository of
information.
Notice that while τ -acceptability ensures that rules are accurate, step 5 of the protocol
aims at improving the recall of hypotheses. The CIL Protocol, upon successful completion,
ensures that the agents’ individual hypotheses H1, . . . , Hn are coordinated with respect to the
case-bases E1, . . . , En (i.e. all the individual hypotheses predict with high accuracy which
examples are positive or negative). Notice that hypotheses only contain rules for covering
positive examples; if required by the application domain, the agents could follow the same
process to generate hypotheses that cover the negative examples. In a multi-class scenario,
agents would run this protocol once for each solution class in {s1, . . . , sk}, considering all the
examples of solution s j as the positive examples, and the rest as negative; the experiments
in Sect. 5 follow this procedure.
Moreover, notice that agents exchange both rules and examples during argumentation. In
the experimental results section, we report how many examples the agents need to exchange
in CIL to reach an agreement, and show that this is a small number.
4.1 Theoretical analysis
Let us show which are the theoretical guarantees that A-MAIL provides over the hypotheses
reached upon completion of the CIL protocol. All the results below assume a binary classifi-
11 For rationalist agents, the protocol moves to 5 in either case, skipping steps 3 and 4.
12 Notice that this might have some negative implications in theory, but is useful to ensure termination.
In application domains where this causes issues, arguments might be allowed back in the argumentation
framework after the agent that withdrew them has received new example arguments; which still ensures
termination, since there is a finite number of example-arguments, while avoiding any negative theoretical
implications.
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cation task, and a multiagent system A = {A1, . . . , An} that has completed execution of the
CIL protocol in t rounds.
First of all, since A-MAIL does not allow for repeated messages, assuming that the gen-
eralization space being used (or the subspace searched by ABUI) is finite, then A-MAIL will
terminate in a finite number of steps. Notice that since ABUI generates rules by generaliz-
ing particular examples, and there are a finite number of examples in the case-bases of the
agents in A, the subspace explored by ABUI is only composed of those rules that subsume
at least one of those examples. Ensuring this subspace is finite depends on the representation
formalism used for representing examples and hypotheses. In the experiments presented in
this paper, we used a formalism called feature terms [14], and the generalization refinement
operator presented in [44], which ensures that this subspace is finite for the datasets used in
our evaluation. In the case of propositional rules (such as the rules found by algorithms like
CN2 [18]), such space is always finite, while for rules in the form of Horn Clauses finiteness
would depend on the specific refinement operator being used.
Let us see which theoretical guarantees can we provide for empiricist and rationalist
agents.
4.1.1 Empiricist agents
Assuming the protocol ends at round t , then the following lemma holds.
Lemma 1 Let all agents inA be empiricists, then for any rule r ∈ Hti of any agent Ai ∈ A,
r is τ -acceptable for every agent in A.
Proof We will first show that any rule r ∈ Hti is τ -acceptable for Ai and later that r is
τ -acceptable for every other agent in A.
1. Let us show that r is τ -acceptable for Ai at the end of the CIL protocol. Since r was
τ -acceptable for Ai when it was initially generated (which is ensured by ABUI), the only
way for r to become not τ -acceptable would be when other agent(s) had sent enough
counterexamples of r . That would have triggered hypothesis revision and, as specified
in the hypothesis revision process (Sect. 3.3) the argument would have been withdrawn
from the argumentation, and thus would not be in Hti .
2. Let us now show that if r ∈ Hti then r is also τ -acceptable for any other agent A j ∈ A.
Let us assume that r was not τ -acceptable for an agent A j . This can be happen in only
two cases:
(i) When A j has too many counterexamples of r . In this case, given that the CIL protocol
is over, A j would have already sent all of those counterexamples to the agent Ai who
generated r (step 2 of the protocol). Since r is in Hti , we already saw that it must be
τ -acceptable for Ai , which means that even after A j sent all of those counterexamples
to Ai , Ai has enough endorsing examples to consider r is τ -acceptable. Because of
step 3 in the protocol, since A j has exhausted all of the attacks against r (including all
the counterexamples), A j would have requested Ai for endorsing examples of r . Since
Ai has enough positive examples to consider r is τ -acceptable (even considering all
the counterexamples of A j ), it can’t be that A j still considers r not τ -acceptable after
receiving the endorsing examples.
(ii) When A j does not have enough endorsing examples of r . This case is similar to the
previous one, because of step 3 in the protocol. Since A j has exhausted all of the
attacks against r , A j would have requested endorsing examples of r to Ai . Since Ai
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has enough positive examples to consider r is τ -acceptable, it can’t be that A j still
considers r is not τ -acceptable after receiving the endorsing examples.
Thus, r ∈ Hti is τ -acceptable for every agent in A. ⊓unionsq
Notice that the previous lemma ensures that the precision (ratio of positive examples
covered divided by total number of examples covered) of the hypotheses learnt by all agents
is strictly higher than τ when evaluated against any of the case-bases of the agents in A.
Assuming the case-bases are disjoint, then the precision of the hypotheses would also be
strictly higher than τ when evaluated against the union of their case-bases. However, since
after performing A-MAIL agents might have exchanged examples, we cannot provide any
guarantee on that respect. Neverheless, as we will see in the experimental evaluation in
Sect. 5, the number of examples actually exchanged is quite small and the precision of the
hypotheses reached by A-MAIL is quite high.
Finally, we don’t provide any guarantees in terms of recall. This is because there might be
positive examples for which, once the global dataset is split among the agents, ABUI cannot
find a τ -acceptable rule that covers them; however, if the dataset was centralized, then ABUI
would be able to find such rule. The A-MAIL protocol tries to minimize this situation in
Step 5, in which agents exchange examples that are uncovered by other agents’ hypotheses.
This increases the possibilities that at least one agent can find a rule that covers one of those
examples. If one agent inAmanages to induce a rule that covers a particular positive example,
this increases the likelihood that the other agents will do so too, since they will all request
enough positive examples to conclude that such rule is τ -acceptable.
4.1.2 Rationalist agents
In the case of rationalist agents, the properties that can be proved of the final hypotheses are
weaker. Specifically, what we know is that each rule r in a hypothesis Hti is τ -acceptable for at
least Ai and is undefeated (i.e. no agent inAhas been unable generate a τ -acceptable argument
defeating r ). However, in spite of this weaker guarantee, our experimental results show that
hypotheses reached by rationalist agents still have high precision and recall (although slightly
lower than those reached by empiricist agents). The advantage of the rationalist marking
function is that, as we will experimentally show, the cost of performing the CIL protocol is
reduced (both in the number of messages exchanged and in overall time).
4.2 CIL example
Fig. 10 shows the result of a real execution of A-MAIL among three agents A1, A2, and A3
that want to perform CIL of the concept Axinellidae in the marine sponge domain. Thus, the
goal is, given a collection of marine sponges of three different classes, learn a hypothesis that
correctly predicts which sponges belong to the class Axinellidae. The agents in this example
use a rationalist marking function.
At the beginning of the protocol, each agent has 20 positive examples and 64 negative
examples of the concept Axinellidae (except A3 who has 65 negative examples). Each agent
performed induction on its case-base, generating an individual hypothesis of Axinellidae.
The left hand of Fig. 10 shows that agent A1 generated a hypothesis H01 consisting of two
rules, while the hypotheses of A2 and A3 had three rules each.
The center of Fig. 10 shows the sequence of messages that the agents send to each other
during CIL using A-MAIL. Messages prefixed by Ai → A j indicate that the message was
sent privately from Ai only to A j . Messages prefixed by Ai indicate that Ai broadcasted that
123
Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst
Fig. 10 An example using A-MAIL to perform CIL among three agents. New arguments are shown in boxes
message to all the other agents. Assert messages indicate that agents are stating new arguments
for their hypotheses, and withdraw messages mean that agents withdraw arguments (that
now they consider defeated) due to the hypothesis revision process, and thus they should be
removed from all the argumentation trees known to all agents.
In the first round, t = 0, the agents assert the arguments in H01 , H02 and H03 , which
correspond to their initial hypotheses induced from their individual case-bases. A1 starts
having the token at round t = 1. A1 finds the arguments γ2 and γ3 to be not τ -acceptable,
and finds a counterexample e26 for γ2, which is sent to A3. Before the next round starts, A3
performs hypothesis revision: e26 is added to E3 and, as a result, both γ2 and γ3 are deemed
now not τ -acceptable by A3. Thus, A3 withdraws them, and a new argument γ4 (that covers
again the positive examples left uncovered after withdrawing γ2 and γ3) is asserted.
In the next round (t = 2) A2 has the token. A2 finds all the arguments currently held by A1
(α1 and α2) and A3 (γ1 and γ4) τ -acceptable, so it does not send any attack. However, there
is a positive example e120 in E2 that is not covered by any of the arguments currently held by
A1. Thus A2 sends this uncovered example to A1; then A1 performs hypothesis revision by
adding that example to E1, and generates a new argument α3 that covers it. Then A1 asserts
the new argument α3.
The messages exchanged during the execution of the protocol during the rest of the rounds
are shown in Fig. 10. At the end, during rounds t = 10 to t = 12, no agent sends any further
message and the protocol terminates at round t = 12. Fig. 9 shows a graphical representation
of two of the arguments, β2 and γ6, generated by A2 and A3 respectively in this example.
In summary, during the argumentation-based communication process, the rules in the
hypothesis of agent A1 were accepted by the other 2 agents, but A1 had to add an additional
rule to cover some examples not known beforehand by A1. A2 and A3 had to withdraw
some defeated arguments (β2, γ2 and γ3) and substitute them by new arguments. Two of the
arguments used in this process, β2 and γ6, are shown in Fig. 9.
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The right hand side of Fig. 10 shows the argumentation trees resulting from all the argu-
ments generated by the three agents. Arguments over a shaded oval are defeated or withdrawn
arguments. Additionally, the new examples added to the individual case-bases (E1, E2, and
E3) are also shown. As we can see, A1 and A2 learned one new example (respectively e120
and e211) while A3 learned two new examples (e26 and e91). Thus, by exchanging just 4
examples (out of the 254 total number of examples present in the three case-bases), every
agent in A has now a coordinated hypothesis for the concept Axinellidae.
5 Experimental evaluation
In this section we report five different experiments. The first two experiments are designed
to validate the two working hypotheses of this paper:
H1: A-MAIL is effective and efficient in achieving coordinated hypotheses, reported in
Sect. 5.1.
H2: Coordinated hypotheses are better than uncoordinated hypotheses, reported in Sect.
5.2.
The latter three experiments are designed to evaluate how performance changes when exper-
imental settings vary. Specifically, we evaluate (1) how does A-MAIL behave with large
groups of agents in Sect. 5.3, (2) the effect of varying τ in Sect. 5.4, and (3) the impact of the
data distribution (e.g. what happens when there is one agent with a much larger or smaller
case-base than the others), reported in Sect. 5.5.
For our experimentation, we used four classification ML datasets (from the UCI machine
learning repository [6]): Zoology, Demospongiae, Soybean, and Trains. The Zoology dataset
is propositional and contains 101 examples belonging to 7 different classes; the Demospon-
giae dataset is relational and contains 503 examples belonging to 7 different classes.13 We
used all the 503 examples, and also a subset of 280 examples (containing the 3 most common
classes) that is typically used in the literature with this dataset. The Soybean dataset is propo-
sitional and contains 307 examples belonging to 19 different classes. The Trains dataset was
originally introduced by Michalsky [28] and is a relational dataset with 2 different classes.
We used Muggleton’s Train dataset generator [36], which can generate Michalsky-style Train
datasets, but of arbitrary size. Specifically, we generated a dataset with 100 trains. We used
each of the different classes in the datasets as target concepts. For example, for the Zoology
dataset, with 7 classes, we run 7 experiments, in each of them examples of a given solution
class are labelled as positive, and the rest of examples are labelled as negative. Results are
the average of the runs for each class.
Moreover, all our datasets were translated to feature terms [2,15], a generalization of
first-order terms, introduced in theoretical computer science to formalize object-oriented
declarative languages.14
All the presented results are the average of 5 runs of a 10-fold cross validation. In each
experimental run, 10 % of the examples were held out to be used as a test set, the other 90 %
of the examples were used as the training set and were evenly distributed among agents to be
used for learning. Except for the experiments presented in Sect. 5.3, we used a system with
5 agents, giving each agent 20 % of the training set. Thus, the case-base of each agent in our
13 Notice that the “Demospongiae” dataset used in this paper is different from the much simpler “sponge”
dataset, also from the UCI repository.
14 The exact datasets used in our experiments can be downloaded from http://sites.google.com/site/
santiagoontanonvillar/datasets.
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experiments contains 20 % of the examples in the training set. In our experiments, we used
groups of 2, 3, 4 and up to 5 agents (each of these agents having always 20 % of the training
examples regardless of the size of the group).
All the experiments reported in this section were carried out using a Java implementation
of A-MAIL and ABUI, 15 using feature terms to represent examples, and rules.
5.1 A-MAIL experiments
The experiments reported in this section aim at validating hypothesis H1. Recall that (fol-
lowing Definition 1) a hypotheses Hi is coordinated with respect to a multiagent system A
when Hi is consistent with the case-bases of A1, . . . , An . Thus, the degree of coordination
of a given hypothesis Hi can be measured as the average performance of Hi in classifying
the examples in all the case-bases of the agents in A.
Therefore, in order to measure how successful A-MAIL is in achieving coordinated
hypotheses, we compare the performance of the hypotheses reached by agents that learn
in isolation (Uncoordinated) with the performance of the hypotheses reached after using
A-MAIL. Performance in both cases is evaluated as the classification accuracy, precision and
recall of all individual hypotheses Hi with respect to the examples in the union of case-bases
E1 ∪ . . . ∪ En of the agents in A. Moreover, since our datasets tend to be unbalanced, with
few positives and many negative examples, precision and recall (P/R) are better indicators
of performance, and thus, we focus our explanation around P/R rather than accuracy. The
higher the performance of the hypotheses reached after A-MAIL, the more coordinated the
hypotheses are (notice we are evaluating performance with respect to the training set here,
since that matches with the definition of coordinated hypotheses, while the next section (Sect.
5.2) evaluates it with respect to an external test set).
Table 1 shows, for the different datasets, the average precision and recall for: (a) agents
just learning in isolation without using A-MAIL (Uncoordinated P/R), (b) agents using A-
MAIL (Coordinated P/R), (c) a centralized approach where a single agent has all the cases
in the training set, and Table 2 shows the same results, but measured using classification
accuracy. The reported performance values are the average of those obtained by each agent
in the system.
Table 1 clearly shows that A-MAIL successfully achieves coordinated hypotheses, both
using rationalist and empiricist marking functions. For example, in the Zoology dataset,
individually learnt hypotheses achieved a very low recall, 0.34 in a group of 5 agents, while
using A-MAIL recall increased to 0.95. The same trend can be observed in the other datasets.
Notice also that, in our experiments, coordination mostly improves recall, but only because
precision using ABUI is always already high. Moreover, classification accuracy is also high,
even with a low recall, since our datasets are very unbalanced, with many more negative
examples than positive ones, as described above. For this reason, precision and recall are
more informative than classification accuracy.
Finally, we can also see that as the number of agents in the system increases, the coor-
dination degree of the hypotheses after A-MAIL also increases. This is because with more
agents in the system, there is more information available to them in the form of arguments
and examples coming from other agents. Recall that each agent only starts with a 20 % of the
training set, so in an experiment with 2 agents, only a 40 % of the examples in the training
set is seen by the agents.
15 The source code can be found in the following URL: http://sites.google.com/site/santiagoontanonvillar/
software.
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Table 1 Experimental results
showing to what degree can
A-MAIL achieve CIL (τ = 0.75)
Precision and recall evaluated in
the union of the case-bases of the
agents. We show results both for
rationalist and empiricist agents
Agents 2 3 4 5
Zoology (av. 7 classes)
Uncoordinated P/R 0.99/0.61 0.98/0.44 0.98/0.34 0.98/0.34
Coordinated P/R
Rationalist 1.00/0.77 1.00/0.91 0.99/0.93 1.00/0.95
Empiricist 1.00/0.77 0.99/0.91 0.98/0.93 0.99/0.95
Centralized P/R 1.00/0.99
Soybean (av. 19 classes)
Uncoordinated P/R 0.97/0.47 0.94/0.33 0.96/0.37 0.95/0.30
Coordinated P/R
Rationalist 1.00/0.72 1.00/0.82 0.99/0.88 0.99/0.89
Empiricist 0.99/0.72 0.99/0.83 0.97/0.82 0.99/0.89
Centralized P/R 1.00/0.92
Demospongiae-280 (av. 3 classes)
Uncoordinated P/R 0.95/0.88 0.91/0.78 0.93/0.80 0.90/0.74
Coordinated P/R
Rationalist 0.97/0.94 0.97/0.93 0.97/0.96 0.97/0.95
empiricist 0.97/0.95 0.96/0.94 0.97/0.97 0.95/0.97
Centralized P/R 0.94/0.99
Demospongiae-503 (av. 7 classes)
Uncoordinated P/R 0.93/0.70 0.90/0.63 0.88/0.64 0.86/0.62
Coordinated P/R
Rationalist 0.96/0.83 0.96/0.85 0.96/0.81 0.95/0.86
Empiricist 0.97/0.84 0.95/0.87 0.94/0.84 0.93/0.90
Centralized P/R 0.96/0.91
Trains-100 (av. 2 classes)
Uncoordinated P/R 0.88/0.73 0.85/0.71 0.84/0.71 0.80/0.73
Coordinated P/R
Rationalist 0.96/0.93 0.97/0.96 0.97/0.95 0.97/0.97
Empiricist 0.95/0.95 0.94/0.97 0.94/0.97 0.93/0.98
Centralized P/R 0.96/0.99
There are no big differences between rationalist and empiricist strategies. Moreover, we
see that thanks to using A-MAIL, agents can get very close to the performance that could be
achieved by a centralized approach having all the cases in the training set.
Table 3 shows, for the same experiments shown in Table 1, the cost of A-MAIL as the
number of messages that are exchanged, and the CPU time taken to coordinate the agents
hypotheses. Specifically, the table shows the average number of example-arguments (Ex.)
and rule-arguments (Rules) that each agent exchanged using rationalist and empiricist strate-
gies.16 For the time measurements, we report the average time taken to coordinate the hypothe-
ses of the agents using our implementation, which runs the agents one by one in sequence
16 We didn’t include in the count the rules exchanged in the first step of the protocol, when each agent shares
their initial hypotheses with the rest of agents. The reason is that they are not part of the argumentation process:
if they already agree in this first step, the cost of argumentation is zero.
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Table 2 Same experiments as
reported in Table 1 (showing to
what degree can A-MAIL achieve
CIL with τ = 0.75), but
measured via classification
accuracy
Agents 2 3 4 5
Zoology (av. 7 classes)
Uncoordinated P/R 0.943 0.923 0.914 0.911
Coordinated P/R
Rationalist 0.988 0.997 0.992 0.997
Empiricist 0.988 0.996 0.992 0.997
Centralized P/R 0.999
Soybean (av. 19 classes)
Uncoordinated P/R 0.986 0.975 0.967 0.966
Coordinated P/R
Rationalist 0.991 0.993 0.994 0.995
Empiricist 0.991 0.994 0.991 0.995
Centralized P/R 0.998
Demospongiae-280 (av. 3 classes)
Uncoordinated P/R 0.942 0.907 0.916 0.890
Coordinated P/R
Rationalist 0.971 0.971 0.975 0.976
Empiricist 0.972 0.970 0.976 0.976
Centralized P/R 0.971
Demospongiae-503 (av. 7 classes)
Uncoordinated P/R 0.952 0.942 0.940 0.937
Coordinated P/R
Rationalist 0.975 0.976 0.971 0.977
Empiricist 0.976 0.977 0.973 0.978
Centralized P/R 0.984
Trains-100 (av. 2 classes)
Uncoordinated P/R 0.817 0.795 0.784 0.775
Coordinated P/R
Rationalist 0.946 0.961 0.962 0.971
Empiricist 0.946 0.956 0.954 0.955
Centralized P/R 0.971
(as part of our future work, we plan to investigate protocols that do not use a token passing
mechanism and allow agents to work in parallel). For comparison, we also show the time
taken by a single centralized agent having all the examples in the training set running ABUI to
generate a hypothesis (Ctl.), and with the time that each of the agents takes to learn a hypoth-
esis using ABUI (Unc.) when learning in isolation, without using A-MAIL. We also show the
hypotheses size reached (|Hi |), which is the average number of rules in the hypothesis of
one agent. Notice that the experiments reported here are the average of running A-MAIL for
each solution class in each dataset. |Hi | is thus the average size of the hypothesis per solution
class in a dataset.
As Table 3 shows, the cost of A-MAIL is reasonably low. For instance, in the 5 agents
scenario for rationalist agents in the Soybean dataset, each agent only sent 3.55 examples
and 1.97 rules on average (each agent had an average of 55.26 examples in the individual
case-base). This is remarkable, bearing in mind the large benefits in terms of recall achieved
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Table 3 Experimental results showing to the cost of executing A-MAIL (using τ = 0.75)
Agents Ctl. Unc. 2 3 4 5
Zoology (av. 7 classes) rationalist/empiricist
Ex. – – 1.08/1.20 0.90/1.42 1.04/2.01 0.75/1.83
Rules – – 0.01/0.01 0.60/0.43 1.03/0.74 1.27/0.96
Time 0.59 0.16 0.16/0.20 0.18/0.24 0.25/0.38 0.23/0.38
|Hi | 1.39 0.44 1.29/1.29 1.67/1.69 2.03/2.13 2.16/2.27
Soybean (av. 19 classes) rationalist/empiricist
Ex. – – 1.98/2.19 2.64/3.71 3.54/5.66 3.55/6.35
Rules – – 0.10/0.10 0.81/0.49 1.63/0.94 1.97/1.11
Time 12.43 1.92 3.52/5.12 6.31/10.45 9.26/16.37 16.41/30.24
|Hi | 2.34 0.78 1.62/1.62 2.21/2.30 3.11/3.23 3.21/3.44
Demospongiae-280 (av. 3 classes) rationalist/empiricist
Ex. – – 5.77/4.67 8.06/12.25 6.63/11.06 7.23/13.95
Rules – – 0.79/0.64 3.64/3.12 4.10/3.30 5.42/4.05
Time 41.93 8.64 10.20/11.94 17.44/26.78 21.94/34.09 27.83/45.59
|Hi | 7.27 2.77 5.56/4.75 7.67/8.11 7.00/8.07 7.98/9.39
Demospongiae-503 (av. 7 classes) rationalist/empiricist
Ex. – – 5.48/6.28 8.45/11.58 15.48/21.85 13.69/21.99
Rules – – 0.92/1.30 2.68/2.81 5.14/4.61 6.48/4.99
Time 110.93 11.87 16.02/23.81 27.07/49.38 88.16/169.86 98.31/177.25
|Hi | 9.57 2.61 5.65/4.81 6.38/7.01 8.66/9.89 9.32/10.92
Trains-100 (av. 2 classes) rationalist/empiricist
Ex. – – 4.94/5.96 10.45/12.5 15.44/18.25 20.12/23.9
Rules – – 1.72/2.39 3.47/2.95 3.99/6.24 9.04/7.12
Time 24.66 4.24 10.05/18.22 37.41/57.55 80.83/229.41 398.31/640.93
|Hi | 5.74 1.99 3.99/4.07 5.92/5.69 7.2/6.98 8.83/8.45
Columns refer to a centralized agent having all the examples (Ctl.), isolated agents without performing CIL
(Unc.), and 2–5 agents using A-MAIL. Rows show: the average number of examples (Ex.) and rules (Rules)
exchanged per agent; the average time in seconds (Time) taken to generate a hypothesis (for columns Ctl. and
Unc.) or to run A-MAIL (for columns 2–5)
thanks to these few messages (Table 1 shows recall increases from 0.27 to 0.89). Moreover,
when we say that an agent (in a 5-agent scenario) sent 3.55 examples, this are in total;
looking more individually, this means that an agent sent only 0.89 examples to another agent
in average (3.55/4 = 0.89, since there are four other agents). Thus, the number of examples
that each agent shares with any other agent is very low. This indicates that A-MAIL can be
specially useful in application domains where sharing all data is a concern, or where sharing
an example has a cost.
Concerning coordination time, the time is dominated by the number of times ABUI is
executed. Since ABUI is a general search-based algorithm, it is slower than other ML algo-
rithms. However, we can see that in some datasets, running A-MAIL using a rationalist
marking function is faster than running ABUI using the whole dataset. For example, in the
Demospongiae-503 dataset, a group of 5 agents using a rationalist marking function only
needs 98.31 s, whereas the centralized approach requires 110.93 s. In some datasets, how-
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ever, A-MAIL is slower. For example, in the Trains dataset we can see that a group of 5
agents using a rationalist marking function requires 398.31 s, while a centralized approach
only requires 24.66 s. The reason is that the trains dataset was specifically designed with
the idea that it should be hard to find classification rules, and thus ABUI takes a significant
amount of time to generate arguments and counterarguments (notice that even if the number
of rules exchanged in this dataset is not specially high, ABUI might be called many more
times without successfully being able to generate an argument, and thus consuming time).
We can also see that agents with an empiricist marking function require much more time
to coordinate their hypothesis. This is because empiricist agents exchange more examples,
which has two effects: making ABUI slower, and increasing the number of rounds required
for A-MAIL to converge. As part of our future work, we would like to study how to adapt
other, more efficient, ML algorithms to be used in the A-MAIL framework.
In summary, these results show that A-MAIL is an effective technique for CIL, which
allows agents to benefit from collaboration with other agents without having to share all of
their examples. Therefore, hypothesis H1 is confirmed.
5.2 CIL experiments
The experiments reported in this section aim at validating hypothesis H2 (coordinated
hypotheses are better than uncoordinated hypotheses). The goal is to measure how much
the agents gain by coordinating their hypotheses. To assess this, we evaluate the performance
(using an external test set) of hypotheses before and after using A-MAIL.
Table 4 shows the results obtained for all datasets measured as precision and recall, and
Table 5 shows the results measured using classification accuracy. For each dataset, we also
show the performance that could be achieved by just centralizing the cases of all the agents
in a single repository using ABUI. Table 4 clearly shows that coordinated hypotheses out-
perform uncoordinated hypotheses both using rationalist and empiricist marking functions.
For instance, in the Zoology dataset, a group of 5 rationalist agents increases recall from
0.55 to 0.87. In the Soybean dataset, in the 5 agent scenario using rationalist agents, recall in
the test set increases from 0.50 to 0.84. In the Demospongiae and Trains datasets, the gains
are smaller, but also significant. We used a paired t-test to determine whether the observed
differences between coordinated and uncoordinated hypothesis are statistically significant,
yielding the following results: the increase in recall is always statistically significant with
p < 0.01, while the differences in precision were not.17
Moreover, we can see that the more agents contributing information into the system, the
higher the quality of the hypotheses achieved by A-MAIL, especially in terms of recall. For
instance, in the Zoology dataset, precision and recall increased from 0.97 and 0.75 for A-
MAIL with 2 agents to 0.98 and 0.87 for A-MAIL with 5 agents using a rationalist marking
function.
Comparing rationalist with empiricist marking functions, they tend to achieve similar
performance. In the Demospongiae experiments, we observe that rationalist agents tend to
have a higher precision, but a lower recall (although these differences are not statistically
significant).
Comparing the results obtained by A-MAIL and those obtained by a centralized approach
using ABUI, we can see that the performance of A-MAIL is always very close or indistin-
guishable (in the Zoology dataset) from the centralized performance. Differences in precision
and recall are only statistically significant in the Soybean and Trains datasets. Additionally,
17 As we said before, precision is already good for the individual agents using ABUI so there is little room
from improvement. Precision, however, can vary with τ as we will show in Sect. 5.4.
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Table 4 Experimental results
showing how much better
coordinated hypotheses are better
than uncoordinated ones
(τ = 0.75)
Precision and recall evaluated in
the test set
Agents 2 3 4 5
Zoology (av. 7 classes)
Uncoordinated P/R 0.98/0.55 0.95/0.55 0.95/0.55 0.95/0.55
Coordinated P/R
Rationalist 0.97/0.75 0.98/0.81 0.97/0.84 0.98/0.87
Empiricist 0.97/0.75 0.98/0.80 0.95/0.85 0.98/0.88
Centralized P/R 0.99/0.85
Soybean (av. 19 classes)
Uncoordinated P/R 0.93/0.50 0.93/0.50 0.93/0.50 0.93/0.50
Coordinated P/R
Rationalist 0.93/0.63 0.94/0.71 0.92/0.75 0.93/0.84
Empiricist 0.93/0.63 0.94/0.72 0.91/0.76 0.93/0.85
Centralized P/R 0.96/0.87
Demospongiae-280 (av. 3 classes)
Uncoordinated P/R 0.93/0.78 0.93/0.78 0.93/0.78 0.93/0.78
Coordinated P/R
Rationalist 0.91/0.82 0.90/0.81 0.92/0.87 0.93/0.88
Empiricist 0.91/0.82 0.89/0.84 0.91/0.88 0.91/0.90
Centralized P/R 0.92/0.93
Demospongiae-503 (av. 7 classes)
Uncoordinated P/R 0.85/0.58 0.85/0.58 0.85/0.58 0.85/0.58
Coordinated P/R
Rationalist 0.84/0.67 0.87/0.70 0.80/0.65 0.85/0.75
Empiricist 0.84/0.68 0.85/0.71 0.80/0.67 0.84/0.77
Centralized P/R 0.83/0.80
Trains-100 (av. 2 classes)
Uncoordinated P/R 0.79/0.69 0.79/0.69 0.79/0.69 0.79/0.69
Coordinated P/R
Rationalist 0.77/0.72 0.79/0.77 0.80/0.76 0.80/0.82
Empiricist 0.76/0.75 0.78/0.78 0.79/0.79 0.80/0.86
Centralized P/R 0.83/0.87
we tested the performance of standard ML methods on these datasets. To ensure a fair com-
parison, we converted each dataset into n binary datasets (where n is the number of different
solution classes), in each of these datasets all the examples of a given solution class were
labelled as positive examples, and the rest as negative examples. The results reported here
are the average accuracy/precision/recall obtained in all n datasets. A standard decision tree
learner (we used J48 from Weka) achieves a classification accuracy of 0.979 and preci-
sion/recall of 0.80/0.86 in the Zoology dataset, and 0.976 (0.65/0.65) in the Soybean dataset.
Low precision and recall values were obtained in the Soybean dataset, since very few positive
examples exist for some of the solution classes, and the decision tree just learned to predict
always the negative outcome in those situations. As we can see, accuracy values are almost
identical to those obtained by A-MAIL but agents using A-MAIL achieve higher precision
and recall.
Demospongiae and Trains are relational datasets, and thus standard propositional clas-
sifiers (like those in Weka) cannot be used. We evaluated the performance of a relational
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Table 5 Same experiments as
reported in Table 1 (A-MAIL
performance with τ = 0.75, as
evaluated in the test set), but
measured via classification
accuracy
Agents 2 3 4 5
Zoology (av. 7 classes)
Uncoordinated 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.902
Coordinated
Rationalist 0.950 0.968 0.966 0.979
Empiricist 0.950 0.967 0.966 0.980
Centralized 0.978
Soybean (av. 19 classes)
Uncoordinated 0.961 0.961 0.961 0.961
Coordinated
Rationalist 0.970 0.976 0.976 0.981
Empiricist 0.970 0.976 0.975 0.980
Centralized 0.985
Demospongiae-280 (av. 3 classes)
Uncoordinated 0.908 0.908 0.908 0.908
Coordinated
Rationalist 0.915 0.911 0.934 0.939
Empiricist 0.915 0.909 0.931 0.939
Centralized 0.947
Demospongiae-503 (av. 7 classes)
Uncoordinated 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.929
Coordinated
Rationalist 0.939 0.945 0.934 0.950
Empiricist 0.939 0.944 0.937 0.952
Centralized 0.954
Trains-100 (av. 2 classes)
Uncoordinated 0.736 0.736 0.736 0.736
Coordinated
Rationalist 0.754 0.796 0.794 0.812
Empiricist 0.761 0.790 0.788 0.821
Centralized 0.844
learning method called LID [5], which obtains a performance of 0.893 (0.79/0.90) and 0.886
(0.59/0.84) in the Demospongiae 280 and 503 respectively, which is lower than the perfor-
mance achieved by either agents using A-MAIL or just agents using ABUI in a centralized
fashion. The performance of LID on the Trains dataset is 0.737 (0.75/0.73), again below that
achieved by A-MAIL or ABUI.
In summary, we can conclude that coordinated hypotheses are clearly better than unco-
ordinated hypotheses. By exchanging a few rules and a small percentage of their examples,
agents can significantly improve their hypotheses (especially in terms of recall). The more
agents in the group, the higher the benefits of performing CIL. Comparing rationalist versus
empiricist agents, we can see that they are almost indistinguishable in terms of precision
and recall, but empiricist agents, as expected, tend to exchange slightly more examples. This
additional cost, however, is rather small and might be justified in some scenarios. Imagine
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that an agent performs CIL with a group of agents A, and then with a second group of agents
B. Rationalist agents, might not have enough of an empirical base from which to defend the
arguments agreed with the group A in front of group B. However, an empiricist agent, at the
end of the CIL process, always has empirical support for all the arguments in its coordinated
hypothesis.
The following three subsections, present experiments designed to study the behavior of
A-MAIL under changing circumstances. For clarity reasons, we only present results with a
single dataset.
5.3 Experiments with a large number of agents
The experiments reported in the previous sections use at most 5 agents. In order to test how
does A-MAIL behave with a larger number of agents, we performed experiments with 10
and 20 agents in the Demospongiae-280 dataset (we used τ = 0.75, as before). In these
experiments, we divided the training set between all the agents in the system. Thus, in
these experiments, each agent starts with a smaller case-base than the agents in the previous
experiments. Specifically, in the 10 agent scenario each agent had an initial case base of
25.2 cases, and in the 20 agent scenario they had 12.6 cases each. It is thus expected that
individual agents in these experiments reach lower precision and recall levels than in the
previous sections.
In the 10 agents scenario agents obtained, when learning individually, an accuracy of 0.826
and precision and recall of 0.88 and 0.57 respectively. After running A-MAIL, agents reached
a performance of 0.908 (0.86/0.86) for rationalist agents and 0.927 (0.90/0.87) for empiricist
agents. Each agent sent an average of 1.22 and 1.46 rules for rationalist and empiricist and
22.11 and 32.11 examples respectively. As we can see, agents exchange more examples, but
less rules. This is because each of them starts with a smaller case-base, and thus, they need to
exchange more examples to be able to generate τ -acceptable rules. Moreover, we would like
to emphasize that 32.11 examples means that one agent sent only 32.11/9 = 3.57 examples
in average to any other agent. However, some portion of those 32.11 examples might be
repeated (sending the same example to more than one agent); thus we are not counting the
number examples revealed but the number of reveals (e.g. 3.57 reveals per agent).
In the 20 agents scenario, agents obtained an individual classification accuracy of 0.747
and a precision and recall of 0.88/0.35. After running A-MAIL, agents reached an accuracy
of 0.886 and 0.917 and precision/recall values of 0.83/0.88 and 0.88/0.89 for rationalist and
empiricist respectively. Again, we observed a small number of rules exchanged (1.10 and
1.41) and an increased number of examples (28.25 and 38.23), given the small size of the
initial case-bases of the agents.
In conclusion, we can see that even with larger number of agents, each of them with
smaller case-bases, A-MAIL is effective in helping them coordinating their hypotheses, and
reaching higher performance, especially in terms of recall. Finally, notice that they need to
exchange mores cases, as expected, but the size of this exchange is adapted by A-MAIL to
the situation at hand.
5.4 Effect of τ
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the role of empirical support in A-MAIL. Empirical
support is used in the confidence measure used to estimate the τ -acceptability of an argument.
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Table 6 Experimental results in the Demospongiae-280 dataset for different values of τ in a system with five
agents
τ 0.66 0.75 0.8 0.83 0.9
Performance in test set (av. 3 classes)
Uncoord P/R 0.89/0.78 0.93/0.78 0.92/0.77 0.93/0.68 0.96/0.61
Coordinated P/R
Rationalist 0.90/0.88 0.93/0.88 0.95/0.87 0.97/0.86 0.98/0.81
Empiricist 0.89/0.89 0.91/0.90 0.93/0.89 0.96/0.87 0.98/0.82
Centralized P/R 0.92/0.93
Performance in union of CBs (av. 3 classes)
Uncoord P/R 0.92/0.83 0.93/0.78 0.94/0.80 0.95/0.71 0.98/0.60
Coordinated P/R
Rationalist 0.95/1.00 0.97/0.95 0.98/0.94 0.99/0.92 1.00/0.89
Empiricist 0.94/1.00 0.95/0.97 0.97/0.96 0.99/0.93 1.00/0.85
Centralized P/R 0.94/0.99
Cost
Examples
Rationalist 5.21 7.23 8.81 9.01 9.14
Empiricist 9.70 13.95 17.54 16.02 16.31
Rules
Rationalist 7.54 5.42 2.09 1.03 0.01
Empiricist 6.04 4.05 1.70 0.86 0.03
We present a series of experiments varying τ in the Demospongiae-280 dataset18 to determine
the effect of τ .
Table 6 shows the performance of A-MAIL in the Demospongiae-280 dataset in a group of
5 agents with different values of τ ranging from 0.66 to 0.9. τ presents a trade-off such that low
values of τ achieve low precision and high recall, while high values of τ achieve high precision
and low recall. For example, when evaluated with respect to the union of case-bases (as in
Sect. 5.1), empiricist agents achieve a precision of 0.94 and a recall of 1.00 with τ = 0.66,
while when τ = 0.9 precision is 1.00 and recall is 0.85. When evaluated with respect to the
test set, the empiricist agents using τ = 0.66 achieve a precision of 0.89, whereas it goes up
to 0.98 when τ = 0.9. This is expected, since a higher value of τ means that rules need to
cover a higher number of positive examples in order to be τ -acceptable. This means that, if
there are small clusters of positive examples, those might not contain enough examples to
make a rule that covers them τ -acceptable. On the other hand, rules that are τ -acceptable
with a high value of τ are likely to be very accurate, since they have a large support.
Concerning cost, the number of examples exchanged by the agents increases as τ increases.
However, the number of rule-arguments that the agents exchange tends to decrease when τ
increases. For example, with τ = 0.9 only 0.01 (rationalist) and 0.03 (empiricist) rule-
arguments were sent on average. This is because as τ increases, it is harder for ABUI to find
τ -acceptable rules.
18 Experiments with the other datasets yielded similar trends. We only report results in the Demospongiae-280
dataset for the sake of space.
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Table 7 Experimental results in the Demospongiae-280 dataset for two agents with unbalanced datasets
Distribution 50/50 30/70 10/90 0/100
Performance in test set (av. 3 classes)
P/R Uncoord (A1) 0.91/0.83 0.90/0.78 0.93/0.58 –/0.00
P/R Uncoord (A2) 0.91/0.83 0.93/0.85 0.95/0.87 0.93/0.88
P/R CIL
Rationalist (A1) 0.92/0.87 0.90/0.87 0.89/0.88 0.85/0.89
Empiricist (A1) 0.91/0.87 0.88/0.87 0.87/0.88 0.84/0.90
Rationalist (A2) 0.91/0.87 0.94/0.86 0.95/0.87 0.93/0.88
Empiricist (A2) 0.91/0.87 0.93/0.86 0.95/0.88 0.94/0.88
Cost
Examples
Rationalist 2.51 2.53 1.73 1.30
empiricist 9.98 10.52 13.48 23.19
Rules
Rationalist 2.92 4.50 5.27 37.43
Empiricist 1.65 1.87 3.42 6.97
A1 is the agent with the smaller case-base, and A2 the one with the larger case-base
5.5 Unbalanced case-base sizes
The final experiment we performed is using unbalanced case-bases, also on the Demospongiae
dataset. For this experiment, we used only two agents, and divided the training set in two
case-bases in different ways: (1) dividing it in two equal parts (50/50), (2) giving one agent
70 % of the training cases, and only 30 % to the other (30/70), (3) giving one agent 90 % of
the training cases, and only a 10 % to the other agent (10/90), and finally (4) giving all the
training cases to one agent, and leaving the case-base of the second agent empty (0/100).
Table 7 shows the results we obtained. This time, we show the results for each of the two
agents: A1 is the agent that had the smaller case-base, and A2 the one with the larger case-
base. As Table 7 shows, the performance of A1 without using A-MAIL (Uncoord) worsens
drastically as its case-base size decreases.19 However, after using A-MAIL we can see how
the performance of A1 improves (especially in cases where A1 had a very small case-base
like in 10/90 or 0/100), and reaches levels very close to those of A2. Moreover, we can see that
the fewer the cases in the case-base of A1, the higher the cost of the argumentation process,
since A1 has “more to learn” from A2. Finally, we can also see that the empiricist marking
function works better in these scenarios, probably because it forces agent A2 to send more
evidence in the form of examples to A1, which A1 can use to then form better hypothesis.
Especially interesting is the 0/100 case, where we have an agent (A1) with a completely
empty case-base, and an agent (A2) with the complete training set. This scenario could be
likened to a teacher/apprentice scenario, where an agent A1 learns from communication
from another agent A2. The framework provided in this paper is general enough to cover this
situation, and the result is an argumentation process where initially the hypothesis of A1 is
empty, and does not cover any positive example; consequently, A2 sends some uncovered
19 In the extreme, when an agent has no cases in the case-base, its recall is 0.00, and its precision is undefined
(0 divided by 0).
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positive examples until A1 can generate a τ -acceptable rule that covers them (step 5 of the CIL
protocol), and then A-MAIL proceeds normally. Moreover, notice that a very small number of
examples have been exchanged between A1 and A2 in this scenario (23.19 with the empiricist
marking function). This means that, as a consequence of A-MAIL, A2 has communicated to
A1 a small subset of cases of the whole training set that are enough to reach almost20 the
same performance as having all the cases in the training set.
In summary, A-MAIL is robust with respect to variations on data distribution and we have
seen that A-MAIL is general enough to model a variety of scenarios in which learning by
communication takes place among n agents, including as a special case the teacher/apprentice
scenario.
6 Discussion
We have presented a rather general framework of inductive learning from communication.
In our framework, any number of agents learn not only from the data they have available
but also by communicating with other agents using a regulated form of interaction based
on computational argumentation. In the experiments presented here, the goal of the learning
agents is to engage in communication until they agree that their individual hypotheses are
adequately supported by the empirical data available to all of them (the task we have called
CIL).
We can view this approach as a generalization of the classical teacher/apprentice (or ora-
cle/learner) scenario, in which a simple form of interaction is performed where the teacher
(oracle) communicates positive and negative examples to the apprentice. Another, more com-
plex scenario is the active-learning [19] scenario where the examples sent by the oracle are
selected by the apprentice following some heuristic evaluation.21 Our teacher/apprentice
interaction, in comparison, is based on argumentation, and rules are also exchanged in addi-
tion to examples. Moreover, the rules being exchanged are responsible for the fact that the
apprentice can learn so fast with a smaller number of examples than would be necessary in
a simpler mode of interaction.
The argumentation process incorporates the blame assignment requirement of learning
processes: each attack, be it a rule-argument or an example-argument, corresponds to some
agent detecting some specific lack of knowledge in another agent. Moreover, since this
detection is based on what the first agent has learnt, this agent is in position to become a
teacher by providing the other agent (that becomes the apprentice) with information amenable
to correct that fault. Thus, the roles of teacher and apprentice are dynamic, and assigned
seamlessly by the argumentation process to those who have the capability (to teach) and the
need (to learn) in a completely decentralized way.
The role of blame assignment in learning processes has been explicitly addressed by goal-
driven learning [30]. Goal-driven learning decomposes the learning problem in three steps:
blame assignment, learning goal generation, and repair (or learning) strategy. This approach
considers a single agent reasoning introspectively about detecting its own failures (blame
assignment), deciding what needs to be learnt to correct it (learning goal generation), and
determining a way to achieve this goal (repair strategy).
20 Higher performance can be achieved by increasing the τ -acceptability threshold.
21 Active learning has the goal to minimize the cost of labelling examples; we do not have this issue here
since the solution to examples is already known by the agent that has the example. A scenario closer to active
learning would be one in which the agents are not cooperative and giving up information incurs in a payment.
Such market-based scenario is beyond the scope of this paper.
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In our learning from communication approach, however, more than one agent is involved
in solving the learning problem. For instance, consider the situation where an agent A2
communicates the attack β1 " α1 to an agent A1. This means that A2 has detected an error
in the rule α1 learned by A1. Moreover, A2 is also indicating that β1 is correct and should
become a learning goal for A1. Now, A1 may or may not accept this attack; if A1 accepts
β1, then A1 engages in a hypothesis revision process (i.e. the repair strategy in A-MAIL).
However, if A1 does not accept β1, then A1 will engage in the process of attacking β1, thus
reversing the roles of A1 and A2.
Finally, notice that accepting an attacking argument (as a learning goal) depends on
whether an agent is rationalist or empiricist. Thus, rationalist and empiricist agents will gener-
ate learning goals, and engage in repair strategies, in different circumstances. The rationalist
agent generates a learning goal when it is unable to defeat the other agent’s contention, while
the empiricist agent generates a learning goal when empirical support justifies so.
The experiments in Sect. 5 focus on a scenario with n fixed agents, but this is just a device
for evaluating A-MAIL performing CIL. Our approach encompasses dynamic scenarios inter-
leaving data collection and learning. For example, consider the scenario where after learning
is coordinated by n agents, one of the participating agents receives brand new data that com-
pels it to change its hypotheses. This is a particular case of our general approach, in which
n agents engage in the CIL process while the starting point happens to have n − 1 agents
already coordinated. Another scenario could be as follows: after learning is coordinated by
n agents, assume a new agent appears and joins the system with brand new data; again this
is a particular case of our general approach, in which n + 1 agents engage in the CIL process
while the starting point happens to have n agents already coordinated. In both scenarios our
approach works seamlessly, since they are particular cases of the n uncoordinated agents
scenario used in Sect. 5.
Finally, learning from communication, as we are advocating here, seems particularly
interesting to lifelong (or “never-ending”) learning. In systems performing lifelong learn-
ing, e.g. NELL at Carnegie Mellon, humans need to “correct” by hand, from time to time,
some hypotheses learnt by the system [13]. We can view this as a particular case of the
teacher/apprentice scenario, but without any principled methodology guiding the changes
effected upon the lifelong learning system. Our approach would be to consider this as a
particular case of our teacher/apprentice scenario, where a human could correct a lifelong
learning system (and justify those corrections) using argumentation. The lifelong learning
system could work on a rationalist or empiricist approach: in the rationalist approach, the
corrections argued for by humans carry a certain weight of authority (since they would be
accepted if the system cannot defeat them), while in the empiricist approach the system
takes a more skeptical view of the teacher, and will engage the human in an argumenta-
tion process until the system obtains enough empirical support to autonomously accept the
intended corrections.
7 Related work
The integration of arguments into a ML framework is a recent idea, receiving increasing
attention. For example, the argument-based ML framework [38], although not using argu-
mentation per se, assumes the arguments are given as the input of the learning process.
In contrast, A-MAIL generates arguments by induction and uses them to reach agreements
among agents by using argumentation-based communication. Argument-based ML is more
closely aligned to the ABUI algorithm. Moreover, argumentation has been applied to clas-
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sification problems [3,41,58], but with a focus on arguing about the classification of one or
more particular examples, rather than about building general inductive hypotheses, as in this
paper.
In our approach we chose to use the existing concept of marking functions [51] to determine
argument acceptability. This notion is very closely related to that of a categorizer in Besnard
and Hunter’s argumentation approach [7]. A categorizer can be seen as a mapping from
argumentation trees to numbers. Thus, a marking function can be seen as a binary categorizer
that assigns 1 (accepted) or 0 (defeated) to each subtree. Moreover, as part of our future
work, we would like to explore the use of accumulators (functions that, given a categorizer,
accumulates all the information in all the argument trees for and against a conclusion into a
pair of numbers). Accumulators are interesting when multiple argumentation trees exist for
the same conclusion, and would allow agents to gauge evidence for and against labeling a
specific instance as belonging to the target concept C or not.
Multiagent learning (MAL) has been studied from many perspectives [56], going back
to the first dedicated workshop jointly organized by the ECML-2000 and Agents-2000 con-
ferences [54] and continued in the ALAMA/ALA series of workshops. Historically, the
most common approach has been that of reinforcement learning in multiagent settings [33].
Our work, however, is more closely related to classification in MAS [37] than to reinforce-
ment learning. Also, our setting is a collaborative learning setting, rather than an adversarial
learning setting [55], and we focus on learning from explicit communication—rather than
implicit communication or coordination, e.g. as in using stigmergy [4]. In the following,
we will briefly overview related work in several subareas of multiagent learning, which are
related to our work.
Concerning multiagent reinforcement learning, the main theoretical difference with
respect to the centralized scenario was stated by Littman [33]: In a multiagent setting, the
optimal policy depends on the behavior of the other agents (that can also be learning) and the
environment is not stationary anymore. Therefore, the convergence property of single agent
reinforcement learning does not apply. A significant amount of work has been done in this
area, such as the work of Hu and Wellman [25] or Bowling and Veloso [10,11].
A more closely related area is that of integrating CBR into multiagent systems. Prasad et
al. [48] proposed an approach based on distributed case retrieval (where agents can retrieve
examples from the other agents in the system in order to solve new problems). This approach
is closely related to the work of Plaza et al. [45], who also focused on distributed case retrieval.
Other approaches to CBR in multiagent systems are those of McGinty and Smyth [35], Leake
and Sooriamurthi [31,32] and our previous work [46]. The main difference between those
pieces of work and this paper is that A-MAIL aims at being a general framework for learning
from communication, that does not assume agents are using CBR.
Our work is also related to multiagent inductive learning. One of the earliest in this area was
MALE [52], in which a collection of agents tightly cooperated during learning, effectively
operating as if there was a single algorithm working on all data. Similarly, DRL [49] is a
distributed rule learning algorithm based on finding rules locally and then sending them to
the other agents for evaluation. The main difference with respect to our work is that their goal
is to parallelize a given rule-learning algorithm to obtain a single centralized hypothesis. In
contrast, A-MAIL is a multiagent approach, where each agent is individually responsible for
its own hypothesis, and where argumentation is used as a shared communication framework.
The ways in which multiple theories learned by different agents, represented as disjunc-
tions of rules, can be merged has also been explored [12]. This method is iterative, and rules
are added one by one to a unified theory attempting to maximize some accuracy criterion.
The idea of merging theories for concept learning has been also studied in the framework of
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Version Spaces [24], albeit in a centralized way. Concept learning in multiagent settings has
recently been addressed in the SMILE framework [8,9], where they study how broadcasting
of examples among agents can be used to “critique” (i.e. attack) hypotheses learned by other
agents. The main difference here is that, in SMILE, agents only exchange examples, where as
A-MAIL allows for a richer communication including rules. SMILE is in fact more related to
our previous work [43], where we defined two strategies called AMAI and RAMAI. AMAI
and RAMAI can be used by groups of agents to attempt CIL but only exchanging examples.
These methods achieve an acceptable degree of success, but require exchanging a very large
amount of examples.
Finally, a related area is that of multi-task learning (MTL) [16], where instead of learning
one task from different collections of examples, the goal is to learn a set of similar tasks from
potentially different collections of examples. The idea is that by learning not just one task,
but also other related tasks, some transfer learning might occur, thus leading to improved
performance of the main task. The main difference with respect to A-MAIL is that MTL
focuses on a single agent learning multiple tasks, without communicating with other agents.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we focused on a multiagent learning scenario called CIL, where groups of
agents benefit from collaboration and communicating with other agents in order to improve
the quality of their individual hypotheses. We proposed the A-MAIL framework to address
CIL and, to evaluate our approach, we used a collection of ML datasets showing that A-MAIL
can, effectively and efficiently, achieve CIL. The core notion of the A-MAIL framework is
that agents learn from communicating with each other in a principled way, namely using an
argumentation-based communication process that allows both detecting errors in knowledge
(blame assignment) and agreeing on which changes should be effected to correct those errors.
One of the most interesting aspects of A-MAIL is that it integrates and automates in a
single framework the capabilities of learning from experience, learning from communica-
tion, hypothesis revision and argumentation. Moreover, the integration of argumentation with
(inductive) learning allows agents to be completely autonomous in all aspects of argumenta-
tion: generating arguments and counter-arguments, attacking and defending arguments, and
finally reaching an agreement on the acceptability of specific arguments (by the group)—all
of which is based on the empirical foundation given by individual learning from examples.
All of those capabilities can be integrated to achieve complex tasks such as CIL, where the
theoretical foundation for that integration is modeling both inductive inference and argumen-
tation as non-monotonic reasoning [39]. In this paper we presentes and evaluate A-MAIL, a
computational realization of these theoretical notions. Notice, however, that the theoretical
model in [39] is an idealization of the whole A-MAIL approach, where only perfectly Boolean
rules are assumed to be inductively valid, in which case the process is guaranteed to converge.
The experimental evaluation of the A-MAIL framework shows that in the more general, and
close to practice concerns, approach where induced rules are merely τ -acceptable, the agents
can achieve an agreement on inductive hypotheses and improve their individual hypotheses.
Moreover, the A-MAIL framework achieves CIL in an efficient way, in the sense that
the communication involves a reasonable number of messages to achieve a good collection
of inductive hypotheses that are consistent with the individual viewpoints of each agent.
Finally, we showed that, assuming finiteness in the generalization space being explored, the
empiricist strategy is assured of finding τ -acceptable hypotheses. The A-MAIL approach
is thus one step forward in achieving autonomous agents with learning capabilities which
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can use, communicate, critique, and reason about the knowledge they learn from examples.
While computational argumentation models are based on the notion of attack (among rules),
empirical inductive learning is based on the notion of support (of rules with respect to known
examples). The approach of A-MAIL is to combine both notions seamlessly. Support is
integrated into the argumentation model as part of the τ -acceptability evaluation, while attacks
are incorporated in the learning process as a form of communication between learning agents.
This form of communication can be seen as a generalization of the classical (and simpler)
teacher/apprentice (or oracle/learner) interaction.22
As part of our future work, we intend to study open multiagent system scenarios with
heterogeneous agents where each agent uses different learning methods, hypothesis revision
mechanisms, or marking functions. Concerning A-MAIL we intend to explore the integration
of weighted argumentation systems, such as [23], into the A-MAIL framework; this would
eliminate the need to define a τ -acceptability threshold, and thus take into account rule
confidence as part of the argumentation process, further tightening the integration between
induction and argumentation. Finally, we would like to study scenarios where individuals in
a multiagent system systematically explore distinctly different parts of large datasets, and
then engage in coordinating their inferred hypotheses.
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